The Religious A Priori in Otto and its Kantian Origins by Mariña, Jacqueline
 1 
 The Religious A Priori in Otto and its Kantian Origins 
Jacqueline Mariña 
Abstract: 
This paper provides an analysis of Rudolph Otto’s understanding of the 
structures of human consciousness making possible the appropriation of revelation. 
Already in his dissertation on Luther’s understanding of the Holy Spirit, Otto was 
preoccupied with how the “outer” of revelation could be united to these inner structures. 
Later, in his groundbreaking Idea of the Holy, Otto would explore the category of the 
numinous, an element of religious experience tied to the irrational element of the holy. 
This paper first provides a brief account of Otto’s account of the holy, especially its 
numinous, irrational elements. Second, the paper analyzes Otto’s understanding of the 
structures of consciousness grounding the experience of the numinous and allowing the 
irrational element to be “schematized” by the rational element. Otto’s exposition of 
these structures is heavily influenced by his reception of Kant’s analysis of the two 
stems of human cognition, namely understanding and sensibility, and their possible 
relation to a common root, which Otto identified with what the mystics called the 
ground of the soul. Yet it is in Otto’s reception of Kant’s Critique of Judgment that all of 
these ideas find their completion, and it is here where we must look to understand the 
relation between the religious a priori and Otto’s category of the numinous. Kant’s 
aesthetic idea is a singular representation given in intuition; it is infinitely saturated and 
as such intimates the ideas of God, the soul, and the world as a whole. I show how Otto 
appropriates Kant’s aesthetic idea and its relation to ideas of reason in order to make 
sense of how an empirically given revelation, for instance, an experience of the 
numinous, can connect with the inner structures of consciousness and thereby have the 
singular import that it does.  
How can revelation be interpreted and interiorized?  This was Otto’s burning 
question at the heart of his dissertation on Luther’s understanding of the Holy Spirit.  
There he had, among other things, reflected on two propositions from the Lutheran 
catechism:  “The Holy Spirit does not work without means; he is bound to the Word 
and works through the Word.”1 Otto struggled with the validity and intelligibility of 
the propositions on several fronts.  First, of itself the Word is not a sufficient condition 
of faith; it is only opened up through the Spirit, remaining dead to the natural human 
being.  But insofar as the work of the Holy Spirit precedes, accompanies, and makes 
possible the understanding of the Word, this is a “work of the Spirit before the Word,” 
and is, as such, an action of the Spirit “without means,” (45) contradicting the first part 
of the formula.  Second, Otto questions the intelligibility of the notion that the Holy 
Spirit works through the Word. This amounts to the claim that one energy works 
through another, and is just as nonsensical as the claim that light gives out its light 
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through warmth (46).  A close analysis of Luther’s claims leaves the question of the 
efficacy of the Word shrouded in mystery.  Why is it received here in one way, and 
there in another?  The Word is not a magical formula that immediately arouses faith; it 
has, instead, a significant content that must be interpreted and appropriated before it 
can give rise to a life-altering faith.  This content can be variously received, and can 
even fail to have an impact altogether if the mind is altogether too preoccupied with 
other things, or if the individual has no sense for religion (48).   
Already in the dissertation Otto was preoccupied with the human structures of 
consciousness that make appropriation of revelation possible, as well as the conditions of 
the possibility of genuine religious experience, concerns central to his oeuvre as a whole.  
This question, of how the “outer” of revelation could be united with the inner structures 
of consciousness was the basis of what he called a “science of religion,” one founded on 
the groundbreaking philosophy of Immanuel Kant. By 1909 Otto had published two 
books stamped by his reception of Kantian philosophy: the first, Naturalism and Religion 
argued that Kant’s transcendental idealism was uniquely suited to assign religion its 
proper place given the success of modern science.2   Kant posited two distinct domains, 
phenomena and noumena.  The first is the realm of appearances or empirical realities.  
Here nature is presented as the measurable and quantifiable and as subject to strict 
causal laws.  It is a closed system, for every natural event must have a cause that is itself 
an appearance.  As appearance, the realm of phenomena is not fully real, and Otto 
continually reminds his readers that this is something that the mystics were already 
aware of.  On the other hand, according to Kant, phenomenal realities are grounded in 
the realm of noumena or things in themselves, which as such, make no appearance and 
remain unknown and unknowable. These are, Otto argued, the true realities that are the 
genuine subject matter of religion. One would search in vain, argued Otto, to find God 
among the real of the phenomena, all of which were subject to scientific explanation. To 
think of God as a God of the gaps in our knowledge of phenomena was a losing 
proposition.  We must rather turn our attention to the intelligible world grounding the 
phenomena if we are to ground a science of religion (69).  How this was to be possible 
was further expanded and contextualized in his second 1909 book, The Philosophy of 
Religion Based on Kant and Fries, in which he presents Kant’s philosophy (as received by 
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Fries) in broad strokes.3  Most significant in this work is his emphasis on Kant’s Critique 
of Judgment as containing the key to the science of religion.    
In 1911, however, Otto embarked on a journey through North Africa, the 
Middle East, and India, and in these travels had several remarkable experiences, one, 
especially, in a Jewish synagogue in Morocco where he heard the Trisagion of Isaiah.4  
These experiences, rupturing all rationalistic accounts of religion, gave rise to the 
phenomenology of religious experience described in the Idea of the Holy.  There Otto 
describes the holy as containing non-rational elements that can only be apprehended 
through feeling.  These feeling elements are, as he notes, “sui generis and irreducible” to 
any other mental states.5  Considered from the point of view of the phenomenology of 
the history of religions, they are what first appear in religious life, and they do so devoid 
of any properly ethical content.  Only later are they gradually filled in with the ethical, 
what Otto calls the “schematization” of this primary datum.  
Concerns similar to those found in his analysis of Luther are fundamental to his 
analysis in Idea, namely, those having to do with the structures of consciousness making 
these experiences possible. And while Kant’s division of existence into phenomena and 
noumena, as well as his exposition of the holy in purely moral terms, could not by 
themselves accommodate Otto’s remarkable insights regarding the holy’s irrational 
aspects, Otto still believed Kant’s philosophy singularly suited to illuminating the 
possibility of the religious experience, its ground in the structures of the soul, and the 
relationship between its rational and irrational elements.  In this paper I first provide a 
brief description of Otto’s analysis of the holy, in particular its irrational elements.  I 
then move to discuss how Otto understood the structures of consciousness both 
grounding the experience of the numinous as well as allowing the irrational element to 
be “schematized” by the rational element.  This analysis will take us deep into Kant’s 
analysis of the two stems of human cognition and their possible relation to a common 
root, which Otto links to what the mystics called the ground of the soul.   
1.  Analysis of the Holy 
 According to Otto, what we understand as the holy contains two elements.  The 
first is the rational element. It is amenable to the human understanding, can be 
apprehended through concepts, and is especially associated with the ethical sphere.  The 
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note is especially sounded in the prophets of the Hebrew Bible.  Amos, for instance, 
preaches, “Take away from me the noise of your songs; I will not listen to the melody of 
your harps; But let justice roll down like waters, and righteousness like an ever-flowing 
stream.”6  Immanuel Kant, famously, identified the holy with morality; in his Lectures on 
the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion, he defines holiness as “the absolute or unlimited 
moral perfection of the will.  A holy being must not be affected with the least inclination 
contrary to morality.  It must be impossible for it to will something which is contrary to 
moral laws.”7  According to Otto, however, this rational element of the holy is to be 
contrasted with its non-rational element.  Two features are particularly significant 
about this contrast.   First, the non-rational element in the holy is first and foremost 
apprehended through feelings and intuitions, and not through concepts.  Moreover, what 
is apprehended–what Otto calls the numinous–is felt to have a sheer overplus of 
meaning that cannot be adequately expressed through concepts; at best the experience 
can be suggested by what Otto calls “ideograms,” metaphors and analogies that point to 
the experience and that help to evoke it.   Second, the idea of the holy is synthetic. 
Rational and non-rational aspects of the holy are not contained in one another, that is, 
one cannot, through an analysis of one element, derive or unfold the other.  Otto dubs 
the rational elements of the holy “synthetic essential attributes.”  While we are certainly 
justified in predicating rational attributes to the holy, “we have to predicate them of a 
subject which they qualify, but which in its deeper essence is not, nor indeed can be, 
comprehended in them; which rather requires comprehension of a quite different kind” 
(2).  Now, it is important to note that the rational and non-rational elements of the holy 
are not two distinct concepts that we can simply predicate of the holy.  To think of them 
in this way would be to treat both aspects of the holy as elements that can be 
comprehended in concepts, and while this may work well enough with the rational side 
of the holy, it would completely inadequate to picking out the numinous quality of the 
holy.  This, as Otto notes, can only be apprehended through feeling, which, as I will 
show in section two, is that faculty through which something that stands outside the 
self is directly and immediately apprehended.  The feeling elements through which the 
numinous is apprehended are simply the direct effects, so to speak, of the numinous 
itself on our psychological constitution.  The numinous is not to be confused with these 
feeling elements themselves, but is, rather that which evokes such feelings to begin 
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with. Key expressions associated with it in Western literature are the Hebrew qadosh, 
the Greek alios, and the Latin sacer. 
 A large part of Otto’s oeuvre consists of a compelling phenomenological analysis 
of the feelings presaging the numinous.  He identifies three principle moments in its 
apprehension, which is experienced as a mysterium tremendum et fascinans.  He first begins 
by providing an analysis of “tremendum,” which can be further analyzed into three 
distinct moments.  These are a) that of awefulness, b) that of overpoweringness, and c) 
that of energy or urgency.  The three moments are intrinsically related and can easily 
pass over into one another.  Otto describes the element of awefulness as the sense of the 
absolute unapproachability of the numinous.  This is well illustrated in the story of the 
burning bush in the Hebrew Bible. When God calls Moses from the burning bush, God 
adjures him “Come no closer! Remove the sandals from your feet, for the place on which 
you are standing is holy ground,” and Moses is afraid (Exodus 3:5).  This sense of the 
unapproachability of the holy brings with it a peculiar dread of a completely different 
nature from the fear that can be experienced of objects in the natural world.  To mark 
something off as hallowed is to mark it off by this feeling of peculiar dread, which 
recognizes its numinous character.  For instance, after Jacob receives the promise in a 
dream at Bethel he is afraid and exclaims, “How awesome is this place!  This is none 
other than the house of God, and this is the gate of heaven” (Genesis 28:17).  
Significantly, the story marks the origin of the northern sanctuary at Bethel.   
Otto notes that this feeling of dread is the starting point in the evolution of 
religion.  It first begins as the experience of something ‘uncanny’ or ‘weird.’  The feeling 
can take “wild and demonic forms and can sink to an almost grisly horror and 
shuddering” (Idea, 13).  Examples from the Bible include the emah of Yahweh (Fear of 
God), which Yahweh can pour forth to paralyzing effect.  In the New Testament we find 
the strange idea of the wrath (οργη θεου) of God, analogous to the ira deorum of the 
Indian pantheon.  As Otto notes, this orge “is nothing but the tremendum itself, 
apprehended and expressed by the aid of a naïve analogy” (Idea, p. 18). The analogy is 
naïve because the notion of ‘wrath’ implies purpose and emotion. But a closer analysis of 
the tremendum shows that no such purpose or emotion is involved, for the element of 
awefulness has two other features worthy of note.  First, this orge is devoid of moral 
qualities.  Second, the way that it is “kindled and manifested” is quite strange: it is “ ‘like 
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a hidden force of nature’, like stored-up electricity, discharging itself upon anyone that 
comes too near.  It is ‘incalculable’ and ‘arbitrary’”. Idea, 18).  The strange story of the 
ark of the Covenant in second Samuel is illustrative: when Uzzah reaches out his hand 
to steady the ark, he is immediately struck dead.8  That the tremendum is experienced as 
such a force of nature is further evidence of the insufficiency of the analogy with the idea 
of “wrath,” which has as its basis the idea of personal purposiveness. 
Associated with the experience of awefulness is the experience of the tremendum 
as an overpowering might.  Its concomitant is the feeling of the self as impotent, as a 
mere nullity, as something that is not entirely real.  Abraham, for instance, refers to 
himself as “but dust and ashes” in the presence of the Lord (Gen. 18:27). Only the 
numen is felt to be absolutely real.  This apprehension of the numen has both 
ontological and valuational components; the numen is not only that which is absolutely 
real, it is also felt as that which has absolute worth.  This experience is at the heart of 
mysticism, which witnesses that the I is not essentially real, and which rejects the 
delusion of selfhood as manifested in the ego.  Lastly, partially implied by the experience 
of the tremendum as an overpowering might, but containing other elements as well, is 
the experience of the energy and urgency of the numen.  This is the experience of the 
living God, of “a force that knows not stint nor stay, which is urgent, active, compelling 
and alive” (Idea, 24).  This energy is captured in the New Testament sayings “It is a 
fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God” (Hebrews 10:31) and “indeed our 
God is a consuming fire” (Hebrews 12:29). The energy of the numen is absolutely 
unendurable; even Moses cannot see the glory of God, but only God’s back, for “no one 
shall see me (God) and live” (Exodus 33:21).  In love mysticism it is experienced as the 
fire of divine love that the mystic can hardly endure. 
The horrifying images in chapter eleven of the Bhagavad-Gita are especially apt 
in capturing the awefulness, overpoweringness, and energy of the numen.  When 
Aryuna desires to behold God himself in his own form, his petition is granted and he 
sees Vishnu “touching the heavens, glittering, many-hued, with yawning mouths;” 
people  “hasting enter into thy mouths grim with fangs and terrible; some, caught 
between the teeth, appear with crushed heads.” And finally the grisly image spreads to 
includes whole worlds: “Thou devourest and lickest up all the worlds around with 
flaming mouths; filling the whole universe with radiance, grim glow Thy splendours, O 
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Vishnu!”  The image conveys the absolute power of the divine over all finite being.  This 
power is, however, like a force of nature; it is an all-consuming energy, its horrifying 
indifference to human purposes demonstrated by the fact that it consumes whole worlds 
containing both good and bad alike.9  After Aryuna has witnessed this, he asks to 
understand what he has seen, but the petition is not granted.  What he has seen must 
remain incomprehensible to him.  This brings us the next characteristic of the holy: its 
mysterious character.  
The numinous is apprehended as mysterium:  it is something that “strikes us 
dumb,” and that brings with it “amazement absolute”  (Idea, p. 26).  It is “wholly other” 
(ganz Anderes) since it is immediately grasped as something that is of a completely 
different nature than anything that can be known by the “natural” individual. The 
mysterium is “that which is quite beyond the sphere of the usual, the intelligible, and the 
familiar, which therefore falls quite outside the limits of the ‘canny’ and is contrasted 
with it, filling the mind with blank wonder and astonishment” (Idea, 26).  As such, the 
numinous completely transcends the categories of the mundane.  Concepts that are 
applied to things in this world are only analogically applicable to it, for it is of a 
radically different order than the world or anything in it.   While we can have a positive 
experience of it through feeling, it eludes all apprehension through concepts.10  Here lies 
the genesis of negative or apophatic theology that stresses the fact that all our concepts 
are inadequate to it.  The concepts we use to refer to it, such as mysterium, are mere 
ideograms “for the unique content of feeling.” In order to understand these ideograms 
the person “must already have had the experience himself.”11  What the numinous is 
“cannot, strictly speaking, be taught, it can only be evoked, awakened in the mind; as 
everything that comes ‘of the spirit’ must be awakened” (Idea, 7).  All of this carries with 
it the implication that the category of the numinous is sui generis, that is, it cannot be 
reduced to other categories such as that of psychology or the social sciences that strive 
to understand the human being in merely naturalistic terms.  
Despite its daunting character, the numen is also experienced as fascinating.  It is 
an object of search, desire, and longing.   Augustine’s famous words well express this 
fascination:  “You have made us for yourself, and our hearts are restless until they rest 
in Thee.”   As such, the numinous ultimately must be sought out, for only it will quench 
the deepest desires of the soul.  Otto notes that 
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. . . above and beyond our rational being lies hidden the ultimate 
and highest part of our nature, which can find no satisfaction in 
the mere allaying of the needs of our sensuous, psychical, or 
intellectual impulses and cravings.  The mystics call it the basis or 
ground of the soul (Idea, 36). 
The numen is ultimately experienced as the source of unspeakable bliss, a bliss 
that is of completely different order from natural happiness.  Otto speaks of the 
“wonderfulness and rapture that lies in the mysterious beatific experience of the deity” 
(Idea, 32), an experience which is beyond comparison with any earthly joys.  This 
element of wonderfulness is vaguely apprehended at the very beginning of the religious 
quest, and is at the heart of the fascinating element of the numen. 
2.  The Religious A Priori and the Ground of the Soul 
But how does Otto envision that an a priori feeling for the numen (the non-
rational aspect of the holy) is possible?12  It is through sensation that individual objects 
are given to us or intuited, but sensation is an empirical faculty, not an a priori one.  In 
the first Critique Kant argued that space and time are a priori forms of intuition, but it is 
hard to imagine that the a priori intimation of the feeling elements of the holy are 
analogous to those forms.  The other two a priori elements discussed by Kant in the first 
Critique are the concepts of the understanding and the ideas of reason, neither of them 
suitable candidates for Otto’s a priori feeling elements through which the numen is 
apprehended.  Yet Otto stresses that without the a priori, the Word cannot be 
apprehended, received, or understood, and he invokes Kant’s claim that while “all 
knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all knowledge arises out 
of experience” (Idea, 112-113).  In a very significant passage he notes, “Kant’s rational 
ideas of absoluteness, completion, necessity and substantiality, and no less those of the 
good as an objective value” refer back to “an original and underivable capacity of the 
mind implanted in the ‘pure reason’ independently of all perception.”  And he continues: 
…in the case of the non-rational elements of our category of the Holy we are 
referred to something deeper still than the ‘pure reason’, at least as this is 
usually understood, namely, to that which mysticism has rightly named the 
fundus animae,  the ‘bottom’ or ‘ground of the soul’ (Seelengrund). The ideas of 
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the numinous and the feelings that corresponds to them are, quite as much as 
rational ideas and feelings, absolutely ‘pure,’ and the criteria which Kant 
suggests for the ‘pure’ concept and ‘pure’ feeling of respect are most precisely 
applicable to them. (Idea, 112) 
How are we to understand this element that is “still deeper” than pure reason?  Is Otto 
still working within the parameters of Kant’s philosophy?  
Yes, he is.  There are two important places where we need to look in Kant’s 
philosophy.  Both of these places were significant for the Romantic reception of Kant’s 
work and its opposition to Fichte, especially in relation to how Kant’s thought was 
applied to religion. The first place is Kant’s remark at the end of his introduction of the 
first Critique where he notes that the two stems of human cognition, namely sensibility 
and understanding “may perhaps arise from a common but to us unknown root,” 
(A15/B29). This unknown root is original consciousness, that is, consciousness prior to 
its reflection in the “I think.”  If there is any place to look for the an idea corresponding 
to Otto’s fundus animae in Kant, it would be here.  The reception of Kant’s work between 
1785 and 1799 was marked by the attempt to understand the relation of this original 
consciousness to totality.  For Fichte and those who followed him, an absolute 
philosophy of first principles was possible through a reflection on the activity of the I, 
that is, on the conditions of the possibility of the achievement of the identity of 
consciousness through the process of reflection:  “the I posits itself as an I.” Because the 
not-I is necessary for the positing of the I, it too was considered an achievement of 
consciousness.  The Romantics countered this philosophy of first principles through 
their claim that original consciousness is factical and is given to us in feeling, namely 
the feeling of Being. While the totality of all existence is intuited in this original 
consciousness,13 it cannot be penetrated by understanding and reason.  There is, then, 
no philosophy of first principles, no absolute philosophy. The ground of existence 
surpasses consciousness and its conditions.  We are confronted with the sheer facticity 
of our existence and are an enigma to ourselves.  Instead of an absolute philosophy 
penetrating the very ground of being, what we have is epistemological modesty and a 
coherence theory of truth.  What we can know is limited to what is given in reflection, 
that is, in self-consciousness.  But the material given to reflection is but a fragment of 
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the totality of original consciousness and its awareness, and can never come close to 
capturing it.   
The second place to look for Kantian influences in Otto is Kant’s third Critique. 
Kant’s successors sought totality in original consciousness, in the moment prior to 
reflection through which the I distinguished itself from the not-I.  The Romantics 
argued that this totality was given in original consciousness as a purely factical one that 
remained unknown and unknowable.  Kant believed we have ideas of such totalities–
ideas of God, the soul, and the world as a whole, but these are merely regulative.  They 
can be thought, but we can neither prove the existence of their objects, nor can their 
objects be given to us in intuition.   Nevertheless, these totalities are represented to us 
in what he calls aesthetic ideas – saturated intuitions symbolizing them.  What we have in 
Otto’s idea of the Holy is precisely such an aesthetic idea, one that opens up 
consciousness in such a way that it is brought back to that moment of original 
consciousness in which the soul stands in direct relation to existence and its ground.   
In the third Critique Kant refers to the “ground of the unity of the supersensible 
that grounds nature with that which the concept of freedom contains practically” 
(5:176).14 Discussing his “critique of the faculties of cognition with regard to what they 
can accomplish a priori,” he remarks on his division between understanding and reason, 
the former having to do with what can be known of nature a priori, and the latter having 
to do with the legislation of pure practical reason.  But to this he adds an “intermediary 
between the understanding and reason,” namely, the power of judgment, which contains 
“in itself a priori…a proper principle for seeking laws, although merely a subjective one” 
(5:177). These three, understanding, judgment, and reason are related to three faculties 
of the soul: “the faculty of cognition, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and the 
faculty of desire” (5:177). The third Critique is concerned with how an a priori feeling can 
be accounted for, or more precisely, how a judgment based on feeling can have universal 
validity.  For example, aesthetic judgments have what Kant calls subjective universality. 
Here we have a judgment based on feeling, which is, as such, peculiar to the subject, but 
which nonetheless is valid for everyone.  Kant answers that such judgments are possible 
in virtue of the harmonious exercise of the cognitive powers of the subject as it judges.  
This harmonious exercise pleases, and pleases universally. What then, is the power of 
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judgment, and how does it shed light on Otto’s category of the Holy, both in its rational 
and non-rational aspects?  
The power of judgment is “the faculty for thinking the particular as contained 
under the universal” (5:179).  There are two kinds of judgments possible: determining 
and reflective.  When the universal is given, and the particular is simply subsumed 
under it, judgment is determinative.  However, when only the particular is given the 
universal must be searched after, judgment is reflective.  Now what is significant about 
reflective judgment is that it is concerned with a singular intuition, and how it is that 
this intuition is to be grasped in such a way that it can be taken as an individual that falls 
under a concept.  Longuenesse rightly points out that there is an aspect of reflection 
even in the application of the categories, “for it presupposes a progress from sensible 
representation to discursive thought: the formation of concepts through 
comparison/reflection/abstraction, which is just what reflective judgment is: finding the 
universal for the particular” However, the third Critique is concerned with merely 
reflective judgment, and what happens in such a case is that “the effort of the activity of 
judgment to form concepts fails”15 In reflective judgment we are first and foremost 
concerned with given intuitions.  In the case of merely reflective judgment, an intuition 
is so saturated and rich that it is impossible to find a single rule of synthesis adequate to 
it, and as such the individual cannot be grasped in such a way that it can be subsumed 
under a given concept.  This happens in the case of judgments concerning the beautiful 
and the sublime, as well as in the case of teleological judgments. In these cases, the 
particular is so saturated and has such an overplus of meaning that it breaks all bounds 
of inner-worldly significance and intimates the rational ideas of God, soul, and the 
world.  
Kant defines spirit as “the animating principle of the mind” which works through 
the purposive setting of the “mental powers into motion, i.e., into a play that is self-
maintaining” (5:314).  This setting of the mental powers into motion occurs as the mind 
tries to find a rule of synthesis for the saturated individual that we find in the aesthetic 
idea.  Importantly, Kant relates the aesthetic idea to the ideas of reason.  He notes that 
the animating principle of the mind  
is nothing other than the faculty for the presentation of aesthetic ideas; by an 
aesthetic idea, however, I mean that representation of the imagination that 
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occasions much thinking though without it being possible for any determinate 
thought, i.e., concept, to be adequate to it, which, consequently, no language 
fully attains or can make intelligible. – One readily sees that it is the counterpart 
(pendant) of an idea of reason, which is, conversely, a concept to which no 
intuition (representation of the imagination) can be adequate. …they [aesthetic 
ideas] at least strive towards something lying beyond the bounds of experience, 
and thus seek to approximate a presentation of concepts of reason (intellectual 
ideas), which gives them the appearance of an objective reality; on the other 
hand, and indeed principally, because no concept can be fully adequate to them, 
as inner intuitions (AA, 5: 314). 
In what way is the aesthetic idea a counterpart of the idea of reason?  In the first Critique 
Kant had argued that, unlike the concepts of the understanding, the ideas of reason 
cannot, in principle, have any objective validity.  While the concepts of the 
understanding have corresponding schemata that direct and limit their application, 
these are lacked by the ideas of reason.  Furthermore, because ideas of reason are ideas 
of unconditioned totalities, no intuition can be adequate to them.  As Kant notes, “If 
they contain the unconditioned, then they deal with something under which all 
experience belongs, but that is never itself an object of experience; something to which 
reason leads through its inferences, and by which reason estimates and measures the 
degree of its empirical use, but that never constitutes a member of the empirical 
synthesis” (A 311/B 368).  On the other hand, all objects of possible experience are 
members of the empirical synthesis, and are, as such conditioned.  The ideas of reason 
are greatly significant in two regards: first, they have a regulative function, in that lead 
us to unify principles (“the unity of principles is a demand of reason” (B362), and they 
have supreme importance in the practical sphere, since among them are found the ideas 
of freedom, the moral law, and a maximum of virtue.  Moreover, it is through practical 
reason and our interest in the meaning of our existence from a first person point of view 
that ideas of unconditioned totalities such as God, the soul, and the world gain 
significance: these condition the core of our existence and the arena in which it must 
play itself out.   
 While an idea of reason is one to which no intuition can be adequate, and is as 
such “indemonstrable,” the aesthetic idea is a representation of an individual so rich in 
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significance that no concept is adequate to it.  It is what Kant calls an “inexponible 
representation” (5:342). Through its saturation and innumerable connections with the 
entire field of experience it intimates the supersensible objects to which the ideas of 
reason refer.  Kant notes that the aesthetic idea “serves [the] idea of reason instead of 
logical presentation, although really only to animate the mind by opening up for it the 
prospect of an immeasurable field of related representations” (5:315).  The aesthetic idea 
“cracks open” the understanding, which continually strives to grasp the intuition, but 
fails to find a concept adequate to it, as the realm of the understanding is limited to the 
conditioned appearances.  The saturation of the aesthetic idea and its innumerable 
connections thereby become symbols of the comprehensive ideas of reason.  
 Since the aesthetic idea is the counterpart of an idea of reason, it is more closely 
associated with Kant’s sublime than with the beautiful; earlier in the third Critique, Kant 
remarks: “the beautiful seems to be taken as the presentation of an indeterminate 
concept of the understanding, but the sublime as that of a similar concept of reason” 
(5:244).  He lists the “wide ocean, enraged by storms, whose visage is horrible” (5:245) 
as provoking the sublime. In the dynamically sublime nature is presented as an 
overwhelming might that annihilates our own; as such, it invokes fear; so Kant, “nature 
can count as a power, thus as dynamically sublime, only insofar as it is considered an 
object of fear” (5:260).  The sublime, however, is not constituted by this fear alone, but 
by the thought that the whole might of nature is inferior to the “moral law within.” For 
Kant, the moral individual and her connection to the supersensible is superior to all 
possible terrors of the natural world. 
 It is, however, clearly the understanding of the aesthetic idea as inexponible that 
was to have such importance for both the Romantics and for Otto.  Both in Philosophy of 
Religion and in his Idea of the Holy, Otto underscores Kant’s understanding of spirit and 
its relation to both aesthetic and rational ideas as Kant’s most important contributions.  
In Philosophy of Religion he mentions Herder as having fully grasped the importance of 
Kant’s aesthetic ideas, noting that  “in the whole of poetry Herder saw a creation that 
urges upwards from the secret and mysterious depths of the soul, a creation of the 
unconscious, the unwilled, and the uninvented; an inspiration that springs from the 
profound regions of the spirit, under divine influence….”16   And in Idea the faculty of 
divination through which the Holy is intuited is related to Kant’s aesthetic judgments, 
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in particular to that which is “not-unfolded” or inexponible: he notes: “in contrast to 
logical judgment, it [the aesthetic judgment] is not worked out in accordance with a 
clear intellectual scheme, but in conformity with obscure, dim principles….” (Idea, 146); 
he further mentions Goethe’s “daemonic” “which “goes beyond all ‘conceiving’, 
surpasses ‘understanding’ and ‘reason’, and consequently is ‘inapprehensible’ and cannot 
properly be put into a statement” (150) in which all elements associated with the numen 
recur.  Otto repeatedly affirms that both rational and non-rational elements of the 
numen are a priori elements, claiming that “in its content even the first stirring of 
‘daemonic dread’ is a purely a priori element.  In this respect it may be compared from 
first to last with the aesthetic judgment and the category of the beautiful” (134). It is 
clear, then that Otto conceived of the numinous in terms of Kant’s aesthetic ideas as 
well as his understanding of the sublime.   
The experience of the numinous is an experience of a particular that both terrifies 
and fascinates, and which, however, also represents unconditioned totalities.  For 
example, insofar as it is experienced as an overwhelming might, the numen symbolizes 
the very ground of all power.  The numen has an “overplus of meaning” and thereby 
functions in the same way as an aesthetic idea.  Because it is given in an intuition in 
which distinct elements are united, synthetic judgments can be made of it.  This brings us 
to one of the more obscure elements of Otto’s presentation of the Holy, the necessary 
synthesis between its rational and non-rational aspects.  The rational aspect is not 
contained in the irrational aspect; these are two distinct predicates, and one cannot be 
derived from the other (136). They are, however, united in the object, and necessarily 
so; hence Otto claims “the same a priori character…belongs…to the connexion of the 
rational and non-rational elements in religion, their inward and necessary union” (136).  
He notes that the irrational element of the holy is “schematized” by its rational element 
and “is filled out and charged with rational elements.”  Now the schema, according to 
Kant, is a rule of synthesis, generated by the imagination, through which an image 
adequate to a concept is generated.  In the case of aesthetic ideas, of course, these rules 
of synthesis are never adequate to the intuition, and conceptualization fails.  The 
aesthetic representation is “inexponible.” Otto, too, notes that even as this necessary 
schematization occurs, the non-rational aspect of the holy is never fully taken up into its 
rational aspects; there is an overplus that still eludes rationalization and is “even 
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intensified” as the revelation proceeds (135).  Yet insofar as an aesthetic representation 
suggests the rational ideas, it must ultimately be taken up or synthesized in such a way 
that it is understood in accordance with moral and religious ideas having to do with the 
ultimate significance of human life.   
How then, does the aesthetic idea illuminate the a priori structures of 
consciousness that make it possible for revelation to have significance for us?  In the 
aesthetic idea we have a symbol of the mystery that is given in original consciousness. 
This symbol awakens the mind and brings it back to that first original moment prior to 
reflection.  The Holy, much like the aesthetic idea, can only be adequately interpreted 
from the first person point of view.  Both the aesthetic idea and the representation of the 
Holy have subjective universality.  It is because each of us is a finite creature who acts, 
who must understand and both self and world, and who must reflect on his or her own 
significance in relation to the indemonstrable totalities with which religion is concerned 
that the Holy is of utmost significance.  Its non-rational elements concern our finitude 
and powerlessness in the face of an ultimate reality against which we must measure the 
significance of our lives;17 its rational elements concern those moral concepts through 
which we must measure what we have done and should do, and which necessarily 
schematize and fill out the non-rational elements of the Holy. In the Holy, much like in 
the aesthetic idea, I am presented with a particular object of experience that works on 
the spirit in such a way that it is confronted with ultimate totalities, with the enormous 
power of the ground of being, both terrifying and fascinating, but which nevertheless is 
necessarily schematized by rational moral ideas. Otto notes that “once enunciated and 
understood, the ideas of the unity and goodness of the divine nature often take a 
surprisingly short time to become firmly fixed in the hearer’s mind” (Otto 139). Rational 
ideas are always already present in our reason and need only be awakened. 
 Following Kant, Otto stresses that we cannot ignore the moral or rational 
element of the Holy. In Religion Kant stressed that “on the basis of revelation alone,” 
without the moral concepts of pure practical reason, “there can be no religion, and all 
reverence for God would be idolatry” (6:169). Hence we cannot simply remain with the 
idea of God as “wholly other,” which Otto coordinates with the idea that the intuition of 
the numinous is “inexponible.” The intuition of the Holy must necessarily be 
schematized by moral concepts.  As Otto notes, were we to fail to do so, God would 
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remain ex lex, outside the law, and we could only relate to God in terms of power (Idea, 
101).  As Kant had argued in his Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, we would 
then be left with a religion of mere servility, one bereft of the moral ideas that alone 
confer on the human being genuine worth.   
Although it certainly sounds questionable, it is in no way reprehensible to say 
that every human being makes a God for himself, indeed, he must make one 
according to moral concepts (attended by the infinitely great properties that 
belong to the faculty of exhibiting an object in the world commensurate to these 
concepts) in order to honor in him the one who made him. For in whatever manner 
a being has been made known to him by somebody else, and described as God, 
indeed, even if such a being might appear to him in person (if this is possible), a 
human being must yet confront this representation with his ideal first, in order 
to judge whether he is authorized to hold and revere this being as Divinity. 
Hence, on the basis of revelation alone, without that concept being previously laid 
down in its purity at its foundation as touchstone, there can be no religion, and 
all reverence for God would be idolatry (AA, 6: 169).18 
In the numinous, the individual is confronted with her finitude and conditioned 
character in a radical way.  Otto repeatedly draws attention to the understanding of the 
self as “but dust and ashes” in the face of an overpowering might that is symbolized in 
ideograms whose significance is ultimately recognized by the soul at its ground.  But 
how must the individual respond to this overwhelming might? To simply respond to it 
in such a way that all that an individual recognizes is an overpowering might ultimately 
leads to fear and the strategy of self-preservation.  Here there are no higher values, and 
no way that the self can really move beyond itself to recognize the value of others for 
their own sake from within itself.  Otto is of a mind with Kant on this: reason generates 
its own ideas of totality that must ultimately be synthesized with the totalities intuited 
at the ground of the soul.  Hence the ideogram points upwards and downwards, 
downwards to the ground of the soul and the totalities intuited through original 
consciousness, and upwards to the ideas of reason in which totalities are thought but not 
intuited.  In the ideogram and through the imagination’s attempt to grasp it, the two, 
namely reason and intuition, are brought together.  This synthesis is not one that can be 
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proven, but is one that is achieved through the moral individual that makes a moral 
decision: faith that at the heart of existence there lies a moral order.    
 
ENDNOTES  
                                                
1 Rudolf Otto, Die Anschauung vom Heiligen Geiste bei Luther, Göttingen: Dandenhoeck 
und Ruprecht, 1898, 45. 
2 Rudolf Otto, Naturalistische und religiöse Weltansicht, Tübingen, 1904; English 
translation: Naturalism and Religion, trans. J. Arthur Thomson and Margaret R. 
Thomson, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1907, 68ff.  
3 Rudolf Otto, Kantisch-Fries’sische Religionsphilosophie und ihre Anwendung auf die 
Teologie, Tübingen, 1909. English translation: The Philosophy of Religion Based on Kant 
and Fries, trans. E. B. Dicker, London 1931.  
4 On this point see Robin Minney, “The Development of Otto’s Thought 1898-1917: 
From “Luther’s View of the Holy Spirit” to “The Holy,” Religious Studies, Vol. 26, No. 4, 
507.   
5 Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, translated by John W. Harvey, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1923, 7.  Henceforward this work will be cited as Idea, with the page 
number following. 
6 All biblical quotations are from the New Revised Standard Version (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), Amos: 5:23-24. 
7 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion, in Religion and 
Rational Theology, translated and edited by Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 409; AA, 28: 1075. 
8 2 Samuel 6:6.  Another example is the story of the bubonic plague that the ark brings 
with it when it was captured by the Philistines in 1 Samuel chapters 5 and 6. 
9 Lest anyone be tempted to think that this frightful image of the divine is merely 
indigenous to Indian religion, compare with the following statement from Luther: “Yea, 
He is more terrible and frightful than the Devil.  For He dealeth with us and bringeth us 
to ruin with power, siteth and hammereth us and payeth no heed to us. . . .  In His 
majesty He is a consuming fire. . . . For therefrom can no man refrain: if he thinketh on 
 18 
                                                
God aright, his heart in his body is struck with terror. . . . Yea, as soon as he heareth 
God named, he is filled with trepidation and fear.” Cited Idea, 99. 
10 Otto notes, “The divine transcends not only time and place, not only measure and 
number, but all categories of the reason as well.  It leaves subsisting only that 
transcendent basic relationship which is not amenable to any category” (Religious Essays, 
87). 
11 Rudolf Otto, Religious Essays: A Supplement to “The Idea of the Holy” (London:  Oxford 
University Press, 1937), 39. 
12 While critics of Otto have argued that his thought is inconsistent in that he moves 
from philosophy in his Philosophy of Religion to phenomenology in Idea of the Holy, this 
section demonstrates the consistency in Otto’s thought in relation to the two books. 
This consistency is further evidenced if the Romantic reception of Kant’s thought if fully 
understood, which brings together two elements, namely the emphasis on the feeling of 
Being and the impossibility of knowledge of the objects of Kant’s regulative ideas of 
reason.   The Romantic reception of Kant’s thought, especially as found in 
Schleiermacher, had a huge influence on Otto.   For a discussion of some of these 
criticisms, see Minney 519ff.  For another defense of the consistency of Otto’s thought, 
see Philip C. Almond, Rudolf Otto: An Introduction to his Philosophical Theology, Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984.  For a discussion of the Romantic 
reception of Kant’s thought, especially as it came to bear on the understanding of 
religion, see my forthcoming “Romanticism and Religion,” in The Palgrave Handbook of 
Early German Romantic Philosophy, ed. Elizabeth Millán. 
13 The point is made by Friedrich Schleiermacher, among others, in his On Religion,   
where he claims that “religion is sensibility and taste for the infinite” (23); he argues 
that intuition of the infinite is given in that “first mysterious moment” before “intuition 
and feeling have separated,” that is, the infinite is given before the process of reflection.  
At this moment the soul “lies at the bosom of the infinite world.”  This moment is “the 
natal hour of everything given in religion” (32). Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: 
Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, translated and edited by Richard Crouter, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988, 1996.  There is no doubt Otto was significantly 
influenced by Schleiermacher; in 1899 he produced a centenary edition of 
 19 
                                                
Schleiermacher’s 1799 version of the Speeches, and discusses Schleiermacher in Idea (10) 
although he takes issue with Schleiermacher’s understanding of the feeling of absolute 
dependence, stressing the phenomenological precedence of the intuition an 
“overpowering might” over the feeling of dependence.  
14 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric 
Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 63. All future references to 
the third Critique are to this translation and will be indicated by the Academy Edition 
pagination, in this case AA 5:176. 
15 Beatrice Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge, translated by Charles T. Wolfe 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 164. 
16 Otto, Philosophy of Religion, 184. 
17 On the development of this idea by the Romantics, see my “Romanticism and 
Religion,” forthcoming.  
18 In Religion and Rational Theology, 189). 
